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Abstract
Top marginal tax rates are positively correlated with the pretax income growth of
the bottom 90%those who are not subject to the top rates. To explain this correlation,
this paper presents and tests a model in which executives can increase ﬁrm proﬁtabil-
ity by: (i) increasing the ﬁrm's level of technology and (ii) decreasing labor costs. In
the model, higher marginal tax rates may reduce pre-tax inequality by increasing the
average income growth of workers. This hypothesis is tested by examining the eﬀect of
top marginal tax rates on (unobserved) relative bargaining power between labor and
ﬁrms and, therefore, on the income growth of workers in the United States. Bargain-
ing power, in both the theoretical and empirical model, is proxied by private-sector
unionization and use of oﬀshore labor resulting in higher imports.
Keywords: Income inequality, marginal tax rates, executive behavior, bargaining,
unions
(JEL Codes: D31, E25, H23)
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1 Introduction
While income inequality has been the subject of much recent research, there has been little
agreement about why inequality in the United States and many other countries has increased
so dramatically from the mid-1970s to the present day. One school of thought has focused on
skill-biased technological growth (e.g. Goldin and Katz [2009]), in which demand for highly
skilled labor has increased faster than its supply, increasing the return to education and
thereby increasing inequality. While this process does seem to explain how the middle of the
income distribution has become more spread out, it fails to account for the terriﬁc incomes at
the very top of the distribution as documented by Piketty and Saez [2003]. Another school
of thought, for example Frank and Cook [2010], attributes the increase to winner-take-all
markets in which those with the very highest skills have seen their reach extend globally
and have reaped the economic rewards. But as Atkinson and Piketty [2007] have shown,
increasing globalization, faced by all developed countries, has not had the same eﬀect on top
incomes around the world. In fact, the huge income increases at the top have taken place
mainly in English-speaking countries, and not in continental Europe and Asia.
Recent work by Piketty et al. [2014] has shown that income tax policy is relevant to this
debate. They show that higher marginal tax rates (MTRs) at the very top are associated
with smaller pre-tax top income shares (and larger bottom income shares), both in the
Unites States and in an OECD panel. This result is not surprising, and indeed agrees with
standard economic theory. But Piketty et al. [2014] also show that neither the traditional
labor supply elasticity nor the possibility of tax avoidance can account for much of the
correlation. Instead, they ﬁnd support for a third elasticity in which executiveswho make
up a signiﬁcant fraction of those at the top according to Bakija et al. [2010]have an incentive
to increase their bargaining power when facing a lower MTR in order to increase their total
compensation. In their main model, executives are able to increase their compensation by
reducing the compensation of everybody else in the economy equally. They show in an online
appendix that this model carries over to a hierarchical labor model in which executives reduce
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the compensation of those below them, but they say: The main diﬃculty with this scenario
is that it is diﬃcult to obtain compelling direct evidence that the surge in top incomes did
come at the expense of lower earners (Piketty et al. [2014], p. 268).
This paper attempts to address that issue by focusing on factors that may aﬀect the
relative bargaining power of executives and labor in the United States. I propose a simple
model in which executives can split their labor between increasing a ﬁrm's total factor
productivity, increasing the ﬁrm's bargaining power over labor, and leisure. Lower MTRs
induce them to work more (or at least harder), sacriﬁcing leisure. Depending on how they
split the rest of their labor, their eﬀorts may lead to a combination of two outcomes: higher
economic growth and higher ﬁrm proﬁtability (at least pre-executive pay) on the one hand,
and lower income growth for those not at the top on the other1. The lower income growth
could reﬂect a decrease in the bargaining power of labor.
I test this model with long-term data in the United States using a full-information maxi-
mum likelihood structural equation model (FIML SEM), which allows the main endogenous
variables to aﬀect each other. The changes in bargaining power stem mainly from a reduc-
tion in labor unionization and ﬁrms' increasing reliance on oﬀshore production, resulting
in higher levels of imports. These two measures, both of which reduce income growth for
workers, are very highly correlated with the MTR, and I show that a signiﬁcant fraction of
the reduction in the real income growth of the bottom 90% can be explained by the change
in the MTRs of the top 0.01%. On the other hand, I ﬁnd no evidence that lower MTRs for
this group result in faster economic growth. Interestingly, the MTRs faced by the top 1% do
seem to be negatively related to per capita growth. Milligan and Smart [2015], in their work
estimating tax elasticities in Canada, ﬁnd similar diﬀerences between the top 1% and top
0.01%, at least at the provincial level. This suggests that instead of ﬂattening the federal tax
code by reducing the number of brackets, the United States may want to return to a period
1This model is completely consistent with the ideas in Kaplan [2012] in which CEOs are (appropriately)
paid for performance or the empirical results of Bertrand and Schoar [2003] that show signiﬁcant eﬀects
of CEO performance on ﬁrm proﬁtability. In this model, CEOs get paid for increasing proﬁtability, the
question here is whether this is done through TFP growth or through zero-sum compensation bargaining.
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of more tax brackets at the top with higher MTRs for subgroups within the top 1%. The
political problem, from labor's point of view, is one of collective action as identiﬁed by Olson
[1965]. As an amorphous group, especially as union membership has declined, labor ﬁnds
it much more diﬃcult to exert political pressure than do the handful of groups representing
the top 0.01%.
1.1 Background of Top Marginal Tax Rates and Income Shares
In the United States over the post-WWII period, there has been a strong negative correlation
between the top MTR and the pre-tax share of income of the top 1% and 0.01%. According
to data from Piketty and Saez [2003] (updated online), the (non-capital gains) income share
of the top 1% has grown from a low of 7.7% in 1973 to a pre-recession high of 18.3% in 2007.
The top 0.01% has seen even more signiﬁcant gains, increasing from just under 0.5% in 1973
to 3.6% in 2007. Over the same period the top federal marginal income tax rate fell from
70% to 35% (although those in the top 1% but below the very top faced a 50% MTR in
1973). According to Piketty and Saez [2003], the 90-99th percentiles have seen their income
share ﬂuctuate, varying between a low of 21% to a high of almost 31%. From 1974 to 2008
the share of this group increased from 24.2% to 27.9%.
The income share of the bottom 90% followed a diﬀerent trajectory. It was 68.1% of
income in 1973 and fell to less than 55% in 2007. Between 1950 and 1973, average real
income growth for this group was about 2.4% per year. Between 1974 and 2010 it was barely
above zero. During this latter period, average incomes of the top 1% and 0.01% grew at an
annual rate of over 3% and over 6% respectively.
Who are the very rich? The top 1%, and even more the top 0.1%, are not just successful
entertainers, athletes, hedge-fund managers, and trust funders. If they were, we wouldn't
really expect any relationship between the marginal rate faced by this group and the average
incomes of the bottom 90%. Bakija et al. [2010] show that in 2005 non-ﬁnance executives,
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managers, and supervisors made up 31% of the top 1% and 42.5% of the top 0.1%2. These
are mostly salaried executives of publicly-traded corporations or executive-owners of closely-
held businesses. In other words, a large percentage of those at the top (especially the very
top) are at the head of ﬁrms employing workers. They show that, in 2005, the income within
these subgroups was even more concentrated than for the relevant percentiles as a whole.
Of the approximately 17% of income that went to the top 1% and the 7.3% that went to
the top 0.1%, non-ﬁnancial executives and ﬁnancial professionals received 53.7% and 66.3%
respectively. Bakija et al. [2010] unfortunately do not include the breakout for the top 0.01%.
If the pattern continued, this group would include an even larger percentage of executives,
managers, and ﬁnancial professionals capturing an even larger share of the pie.
Typically, models that focus on the eﬀects of increasing the top MTR concentrate on
two sets of outcomes: the eﬀects on those who earn the top incomes, the eﬀects of after-tax
income redistribution, or both. Slemrod [2000] provides a summary of both the relevant
questions on how raising the top MTR may aﬀect the rich and the various lines of research.
One important question is whether those at the top of the income distribution will work less
when MTRs are increased. Moﬃtt and Wilhelm [2000] use the 1986 Tax Reform Act and
Survey of Consumer Finances to look for eﬀects of changes in the MTR on both adjusted
gross income and hours worked. Consistent with Feldstein [1995], they ﬁnd that reported
income increases as MTRs decrease. However, they ﬁnd little eﬀect of changes in MTRs on
the number of hours worked, possibly because high-income workers already put in very high
hours. In response, Taber [2000] points out that the increase in reported income due to low
marginal rates may be attributable to a change in the type of work, rather than the quantity
(and may not be due to tax avoidance).
In their survey of tax elasticities, Saez et al. [2012] also point out that while hours worked
do not seem to be sensitive to tax rates, taxable income is. They discuss the possibility of
externalities in response to changes in tax rates, such as charitable giving and mortgage-
2Financial professionals, including management, added 13.9% and 18.0% respectively.
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ﬁnanced housing purchases. Saez et al. mention the possibility that executives may work to
increase their pay when faced with lower MTRs at the expense of shareholders as discussed
in Bebchuk and Fried [2004]. They do not mention the possibility that executives may do
the same thing with respect to workers' wages.
But what do CEOs actually do? Classical economic theory says that they are hired by
shareholders to maximize the ﬁrm's long-term proﬁts (see Kaplan [2012] and Bertrand and
Schoar [2003] for support of this theory). This relationship has been analyzed as a principal-
agent problem in which the goals of the CEO may diﬀer from those of shareholders. But
less has been said about the mechanisms through which CEOs are meant to increase proﬁts.
Gabaix and Landier [2008] propose a model in which executives have diﬀerent talent levels
which interact with ﬁrm size to explain the fact that while proﬁt levels explain only a small
fraction of CEO pay, ﬁrm size explains a lot (Tosi et al. [2000]). A hint of one CEO task
comes from both Banning and Chiles [2007] and Gomez and Tzioumis [2011], both of which
ﬁnd that CEOs of non-union ﬁrms earn more than CEOs in union ﬁrms. Think of a ﬁrm as
an entity that takes inputs (labor, capital, technology, executive skill) and creates positive
economic proﬁts (or rents). It must then distribute those proﬁts among its inputs. How
they get distributed will depend on a number of factors, and these will reﬂect the relative
bargaining power of each group. For our purposes, the most relevant issue is the relative
bargaining power of labor.
Traditionally, unions signiﬁcantly increased labor's bargaining power. Bluestone and
Bluestone [1992] found that union workers earned 15-20% more than non-union workers 20
years ago. Recent work (Blanchﬂower and Bryson [2003], Blanchﬂower and Bryson [2004],
Blackburn [2008], Hirsch [2008]) ﬁnds that the wage diﬀerential may be a bit lower, but is
still at least 10%. Lemieux [2008] shows that declining union membership in the U.S. is
likely one cause of increasing wage inequality.
In the 1970s and 1980s, union-management relations became more contentious. Kochan
et al. [1986] believe this was due to increased competitive pressure from lower-cost labor
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abroad and non-union workers in the United States. They note that of the two million jobs
lost in manufacturing in the early 1980s, half were union jobs. Bluestone and Bluestone
[1992] note that as ﬁrms' proﬁt levels began to decline two decades after WWII, one route
managers took was to aggressively challenge the wage demands of their employees (p.67).
Walton et al. [1994] claim that managers opposed unions not only to increase their own
ﬂexibility and the productivity of their workers, but also to reduce pay and beneﬁts, either
in absolute terms or relative to their previous growth rates. Some recent research has found
that an increased reliance on oﬀ-shore production has reduced wages for workers in similar
industries (Autor et al. [2013] and Ebenstein et al. [2013]), a ﬁnding supported in this paper,
although other research (such as Gomez et al. [2013]) ﬁnds less of an eﬀect, at least for
service sector employees.
The following section presents the model in which executives choose between leisure and
work and decide on how to split their time between the two types of workincreasing a ﬁrm's
total factor productivity and increasing the ﬁrm's bargaining power over labor. Section three
tests the model's hypotheses with a time series data set for the United States. Section four
concludes and oﬀers steps for further research.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
There are an exogenous number of ﬁrms, n, in the market, producing a homogenous good.
There is also an unproduced good, M , serving as the numeraire. Following Lasselle and
Svizzero [2005], ﬁrms compete in a Cournot oligopoly in the produced good. The total
demand curve depends on its price and total disposable income in the economy (I +M):
Q = D(pj, I,M)
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The two main assumptions are that demand is decreasing in price and increasing in total
income:
∂D(pj, I,M)
∂pj
< 0
∂D(pj, I,M)
∂I
> 0
Firms are assumed to be large enough in their market that they possess some market
power, but small enough in the total economy that they take income as given (as in Hart
[1982]). Each ﬁrm's demand curve will depend on total income and the production of the
rest of the ﬁrms in the market:
qj = Dj(pj, I,M,Q− qj)
Firms produce according to the production function:
yj = Ajf(L
D
j , L
F
j ) (1)
Where Aj is the ﬁrm's level of technology, L
D is domestic labor and LF is foreign labor.
I assume that domestic labor is paid the endogenous wage, ω, and foreign labor is paid the
exogenous wage, ωˆ, where I assume that ω > ωˆ. The production function, f(·, ·) is assumed
to be increasing and at least weakly concave in both inputs. The productivity of domestic
labor is assumed to be greater than that of foreign labor, f1(·, ·) > f2(·, ·). In addition,
there is assumed to be a (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) ﬁxed cost of producing overseas of ∆j(L
F
j ) (where
∆(0) = 0).
For a given market price, pj, and with ﬁrm production equal to ﬁrm demand (yj = qj),
ﬁrm proﬁt is then:
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pij = pjyj − ωLDj − ωˆLFj −∆j(LFj )
If we let a ﬁrm's marginal cost be cj
(
LDj , L
F
j , Aj
)
, which is a function of how much
domestic and oﬀshore labor is used and the ﬁrm's level of technology, the proﬁt-maximizing
decision becomes a (more or less) straightforward Cournot game. Each ﬁrm's quantity and
proﬁt are increasing in the level of demand (which is increasing in income) and decreasing
in marginal cost. The price is increasing in the level of demand/income and increasing in
the marginal cost. Proﬁts, for the ﬁrm and in total, are increasing in demand/income and
decreasing in marginal cost. Marginal costs, in turn, are decreasing in the ﬁrm's level of
technology and increasing in the average wage paid to labor, ω¯:
∂pij
∂I
> 0
∂pij
∂aj
> 0
∂pij
∂ω¯
< 0
There are three distinct types of agents in the model: workers (Ni), shareholders (Ns),
and executives (Ne). I assume that workers make up the bulk of the population so that:
Ni  Ns > Ne and Ni +Ns +Ne = 1
The focus of this model is the role of the head of the ﬁrm, the chief executive oﬃcer
(CEO). While CEOs can have a number of incentives (minimizing risk, increasing tenure,
building reputation, etc.), this paper assumes that the CEO's goal is to maximize utility,
which depends on consumption and leisure. The CEO's pay is assumed to be directly related
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to proﬁts. In this model, proﬁts increase with the level of technology (Aj) and decrease with
the wage rate paid to workers (ω¯). CEOs can split their time (e) between encouraging the
ﬁrm to improve the level of technology (eA) or by decreasing the wage rate (eω) (through
bargaining, reducing the power of unions, sending production oﬀshore, etc.), or leisure (l).
In return, I make the simplifying assumption that CEOs are paid some fraction, γ, of the
ﬁrm's proﬁts3.
Executives make up a mass of Ne of the population. Total executive income is Ie =´
j
(γ(pij)de and disposable income is I
D
e =
´
j
(1− τe)γ(pij)de.
The remainder of proﬁts, (1− γ)pij, are distributed to shareholders who are assumed to
be distinct from the workers of the ﬁrms. Shareholders, with a mass of Ns, receive a share of
the ﬁrm's proﬁts as their income. Total income for shareholders is then Is =
´
j
(1 − γ)pijds
and disposable income is IDs =
´
j
(1− τs)(1− γ)pijds.
Because ﬁrms can choose to produce domestically and/or oﬀshore, imports from ﬁrm j
will equal:
IMj = pjAjf(·, LFj )
Government has to fund some exogenous level of spending G¯ with tax revenue from
executives, shareholders, and workers. The government's budget constraint is then:
G¯ = τω
ˆ
i
ωidi+ τs
ˆ
j
(1− γ)pijds+ τe
ˆ
j
g(pij)de (2)
The average tax rate in the economy is then:
τ¯ =
G¯
Iω + Is + Ie
=
τω
´
i
ωidi+ τs
´
j
(1− γ)pijds+ τe
´
j
γ(pij)de´
i
ωdi+
´
j
((1− γ)pij) ds+
´
j
γ(pij)de
(3)
3This assumes that the principal-agent problem between shareholders and executives has been solved
and so their incentives are aligned. As Bebchuk and Fried [2004] note, this may not be the case and there
may be an additional bargaining problem to be solved. This assumption, however, allows me to focus more
speciﬁcally on the executive-worker bargaining problem.
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Total demand comes from workers, shareholders, executives and the government and
must, in equilibrium, be equal to total output as there is no investment in this economy.
However, the output that is produced oﬀshore, with foreign labor, will be classiﬁed as im-
ports, so that consumption is:
C = IDω + I
D
s + I
D
e
Total nominal output is:
Y = Y D + Y F =
ˆ
j
pjyjdj
Which can be broken into domestic output and imports (production done oﬀshore):
Y = Y D + IM =
ˆ
j
pjAjf(L
D
j , ·)dj +
ˆ
j
pjAjf(·, LFj )dj = Iω + Is + Ie + Iωˆ = Iω + Π + Iωˆ
And the national accounting identity (setting domestic output equal to domestic demand
minus imports) equal to total domestic income:
GDP = Y D = C + G¯− IM = Iω + Is + Ie = GDI
or
ˆ
j
pjAjf(L
D
j , ·)dj =
ˆ
i
ωidi+
ˆ
j
(1− γ)pijds+
ˆ
j
γ(pij)de−
ˆ
j
pjAjf(·, LFj )dj (4)
As described above, workers are not able to split their time and must either work or not.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that workers are homogenous and have a reservation
wage equal to ωR. So long as there is demand for their labor and the oﬀered wage is above
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this reservation wage, workers will supply labor to the ﬁrms. In order for workers to be hired
in equilibrium the realized wage, ωj, must be between the workers' reservation wage and the
wage at which ﬁrm proﬁts are zero, ω0, which can be above the worker's marginal product
when there are positive economic proﬁts. In addition, I assume that the exogenous foreign
wage rate, ωˆ, is less than the reservation wage:
ωˆ < ωR ≤ ωj(zj) ≤ AfD(LDj , LFj ) < ω0 (5)
While the wage rate for foreign workers is (assumed) ﬁxed at ωˆ, the wage rate for do-
mestic workers depends on the relative bargaining power between workers and executives
(as representatives of the ﬁrms), zj. In a perfectly competitive labor market with full in-
formation, workers are paid their marginal product, AjfD(L
D
j , ·) in this model. However, a
worker's marginal product can be diﬃcult, if not impossible, to observe and there are fric-
tional costs associated with ﬁnding a new job or new workers. Therefore there will be some
surplus created by each worker-ﬁrm match (as in Mortensen and Pissarides [1994]), which
will be split depending on the relative bargaining power of workers and ﬁrms.
I assume that the bargaining power of a ﬁrm, zj, depends on the ﬁrm's ability to move
work oﬀshore (which, in turn, depends on the ﬁrm's ﬁxed cost of oﬀshoring, ∆j(L
F
j )) and the
unionization rate in the ﬁrm's industry (unj). The ﬁrm's bargaining power, zj
(
LFj , unj
)
, will
be increasing in its use of oﬀshore labor and decreasing in the unionization of its workforce.
How much oﬀshore labor a ﬁrm uses will depend on the relative marginal and ﬁxed costs.
Assuming that ωˆ < ωj, ﬁrms with a lower ﬁxed cost of oﬀshoring and/or greater production
(so that the average ﬁxed cost is lower) will use more oﬀshore labor, lowering marginal costs
and increasing proﬁts. Executives can spend time and eﬀort on reducing the power of labor
to organize and form unions, ez, or they can spend time and eﬀort increasing the level of
technology in the ﬁrm, eA.
I assume that the level of unionization, unj, and the ﬁrm's cost of oﬀshore production,
∆j, are functions of executive eﬀort in that area, ez. That is, executives can spend some of
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their eﬀort reducing unionization levels in their ﬁrm or decreasing their cost of producing
with less costly foreign labor. This increases the ﬁrm's bargaining power, zj, and allows the
ﬁrm to reduce the average wage rate in the ﬁrm, reducing marginal costs and increasing
proﬁts. This may take the form of direct anti-union activities in the workplace or lobbying
state or federal government for more corporate-friendly policies; such lobbying eﬀorts could
include supporting right-to-work laws and opposing laws that make unionization easier (see
Campolieti et al. [2013] and Lipset et al. [2005] for a U.S.-Canada comparison that shows
more direct anti-union action in Canada, likely due to weaker U.S. union power). Eﬀort
on the part of executives to increase the ﬁrm's bargaining power could include forming
partnerships with overseas companies, scouting overseas locations, and any other activity
that will make oﬀ-shore production easier.
In addition to increasing a ﬁrm's bargaining power vis-a-vis labor, an executive can
spend eﬀort on increasing the ﬁrm's level of technology. This will reduce marginal costs and
increase proﬁts. For example, Bloom et al. [2013] ﬁnd that better management techniques
signiﬁcantly increase productivity in India, with managerial time being one of the constraints
on such practices being more widely adopted.
I assume that returns to both types of an executive's labor are increasing in terms of
proﬁts and are (at least weakly) concave:
A′(eA) > 0
A′′(eA) ≤ 0 (6)
un′(ez) < 0
un′′(ez) ≥ 0
The CEO has one unit of time/eﬀort available each period so that the time constraint is
given by:
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eA + ez + l = 1 (7)
and must pay a tax rate on income of τe < 1. CEOs receive utility from both consumption,
c, and leisure, l. Utility is assumed to be increasing and concave in both arguments. Because
there is no savings in this model, consumption is simply equal to after-tax income. We can
summarize the CEO's problem as:
max
eA,eω ,l,L
D
j ,L
F
j
u(c, l) (8)
s.t. (1) c = (1− τe)
[
γ
(
pjAj(eA)f(L
D
j , L
F
j )− ωj
(
zj(L
F
j , unj(ez))
)
LDj − ωˆLFj −∆(LFj )
)]
(2) eA + ez + l = 1
where the executive is making the individual decisions about how to split his time and
eﬀort and also choosing the ﬁrm's proﬁt maximizing levels of domestic and foreign labor.
Substituting in for consumption, c, and leisure, l, and allowing f1 and f2 to be the partial
derivative of the production function with respect to domestic and foreign labor, respectively,
and z1 and z2 to be the ﬁrst derivative of the bargaining power with respect to foreign labor
and unionization levels, respectively, we get the FOCs:
uc(c, l)(1− τe)γpA′(eA)f(LD, LF )− ul(c, l) = 0 (9)
−uc(c, l)(1− τe)γω′(z, un)z2(LF , un)LD − ul(c, l) = 0 (10)
uc(c, l)(1− τe)γpAf1(LD, LF )− ω(z) = 0 (11)
uc(c, l)(1− τe)γpAf2(LD, LF )− ω′(z)z1(LF , un)LD − ωˆ −∆′(LF ) = 0 (12)
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where ∆′(LF ) in (12) is either equal to 0 if LF = 0 or some ﬁxed ∆j if LF > 0. Combining
(9) and (10) we get:
pA′(eA)f(LD, LF ) = ω′(z, un)z2(LF , un)un′(eω)LD (13)
Equation (13) says that executives will equate the marginal beneﬁt of each type of eﬀort.
Equations (11) and (12) equate the marginal product of each type of labor with its marginal
revenue. The interesting part of (12) is the additional term −ω′(z)z1(LF , un)LD > 0. This
shows the additional beneﬁt to the ﬁrm of using foreign labor in that it reduces the wage
of domestic workers by increasing a ﬁrm's bargaining power. Combining (11) and (12), the
ﬁrm equates the marginal product of each type of labor with its marginal cost:
f1(L
D, LF )
f2(LD, LF )
=
ω(z)
ω′(z)z1(LF , un)LD + ωˆ + ∆′(LF )
(14)
Executives will also adjust work and leisure so that the marginal beneﬁt of leisure is equal
to the marginal beneﬁt of work (in terms of additional consumption):
(1− τe)γA′(eA)f(LD, LF ) = ul(c, l)
uc(c, l)
(15)
Where ul and uc are the marginal utility of leisure and consumption, respectively. Equa-
tion (15) shows that as the tax rate faced by executives increases (so that the LHS decreases),
executives will increase leisure and decrease consumption (and, therefore, work time/eﬀort).
With this model, we can see the eﬀects of a change in the top MTR not only on the
income shares (g(Π)/Y D for executives, ωLD/Y D for workers), but also on the growth rates of
income for executives and for workers. Through (14) and (15), an increase in the executive's
MTR, τe, induces the executives to provide less eﬀort in both increasing the ﬁrms' bargaining
position and increasing the ﬁrm's technology. This has two eﬀects on a worker's wage. First,
it will increase unionization, raising the workers' bargaining power and pushing workers'
wages closer to their marginal product. However, because it will reduce the value of Aj, it
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will also reduce the worker's marginal product, potentially reducing the wage, depending on
the strength of the two eﬀects.
The executive tax rate also enters into the ﬁrm's proﬁt-maximizing decision in (15)
through the eﬀect of ez on bargaining power, and, therefore, the relative marginal costs
of domestic vs. foreign labor. A higher MTR reduces eﬀort, ez, which in turn increases
unionization levels which increases the domestic wage rate and should decrease the amount
of domestic labor used.
This leads to the following testable hypotheses:
• H1: An increase in the top MTR should lead to a decrease in each ﬁrm's level of
technology and, therefore, slower real GDP per capita growth.
• H2: An increase in the top MTR should lead to a decrease in each ﬁrm's bargaining
power towards labor, leading to lower (pre-executive pay) corporate proﬁts as a share
of total income.
• H3a: An increase in the top MTR should lead to an increase in private-sector union-
ization.
• H3b: An increase in the top MTR should lead to a decrease in reliance on oﬀshore
production and, therefore, a decrease in imports as a percent of GDP.
Because wage growth depends positively on the growth in TFP (Aj) and negatively on the
ﬁrm's bargaining power, zj, the eﬀect of an increase of the top MTR (which is hypothesized
to reduce both Aj and zj) is ambiguous and must be left to the empirical results. However,
we can say:
• H4: If the TFP eﬀect of a change in the top MTR dominates the bargaining eﬀect, then
an increase in the top MTR will reduce income growth for workers. If the opposite is
true, then an increase in the top MTR will lead to an increase in the income growth of
workers.
16
There may be general equilibrium eﬀects not captured in the four hypotheses above. In-
specting equation (6), GDP will depend on the overall level of technology and total domestic
labor used. The model assumes that a higher tax on executives will lead to a lower level of
technological growth (as executives supply less eA). It will also lead to higher unionization,
higher wages, and, therefore, less domestic labor used. On the other hand, domestic demand
depends (one-for-one) on domestic income, or GDI4. A higher executive tax rate will lead to
a pre-tax income redistribution between workers and executives/shareholders as the labor
share of income increases and proﬁt decreases. While this redistribution does not aﬀect de-
mand in the model, aggregate demand will be reduced by ﬁrms substituting foreign labor for
domestic. Cheaper foreign labor, however, will reduce ﬁrms' marginal costs, reducing prices
but increasing proﬁts5. The net eﬀect on real GDP growth, as opposed to H1, is unclear but
will be tested in the next section.
3 Empirical tests
3.1 Data
The data set used in this section is a time series combination of U.S. tax data (Piketty
and Saez [2003], updated online, Tax Policy Center, 2010, and Barro and Redlick [2011]),
macroeconomic variables (BEA), union data (from Hirsch and Macpherson [2002], updated
online) and data on the political composition of the U.S. House of Representatives, Senate,
and Presidency. The main explanatory variable is the federal marginal income tax rate faced
by those just in the top 1% and by those just in the top 0.01%, standing in for the executive
MTR6. The MTR is calculated by comparing historical tax tables and the nominal threshold
4As opposed to a Post-Keynesian or Kaleckian model in which the rich have a lower marginal propensity
to consume than the workers, in this model the MPC = 1 for all groups.
5This all depends on a Cournot-like market structure. If the market is perfectly competitive, the eﬀects
would be diﬀerent.
6This is based on gross income minus government transfers and the nominal threshold to enter into each
income group. Each household will face a potentially diﬀerent marginal rate depending on how deductions
aﬀect AGI.
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for each top income group. There has been substantial variation in the tax rates faced by
these two groups, and as noted above, the concentration of executives appears to increase as
we move up the income distribution.
The mechanism in the model through which executives are able to reduce average wage
growth depends on the ﬁrm's bargaining power which, in turn, depends on unionization levels
and use of foreign labor. A lower MTR induces executives to work more (or more intensively),
splitting their time between increasing the ﬁrm's level of technology (and productivity) and
increasing bargaining power. This implies that a decrease in the top MTR should lead to
lower private union membership which in turn should lead to lower wage growth for workers.
Figure 1 plots the MTR for those just in the top 0.01% and private union membership from
Hirsch and Macpherson [2002]. As you can see, there is an extremely strong correlation
(ρ = 0.92). The ﬁgure also lists some of the major labor and tax events of the time period,
showing ﬁrst an increase in labor's bargaining power with passage of the Wagner Act and
increases in the top MTR in 1935 and then a slow erosion of labor's bargaining power. By
the 1980s Reagan was able to break the PATCO strike by ﬁring 11,345 air traﬃc controllers
and to cut the top federal MTR to less than 30%.
[Figure 1 about here.]
I use the the average income growth of the bottom 90% (as opposed to income shares
as in Piketty et al. [2014]) as a stand-in for average wage growth of the workers. Similarly,
because total executive pay is not available, I will use the share of the top 1% and 0.01% as
a measure of this income group. In order to focus on long-term trends rather than business
cycle eﬀects, I have smoothed the annual data of all growth rates using a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter7. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. I focus on the growth, both of real GDP
per capita and in real average income of the bottom 90%, rather than the level, because of
the implications of the model in section 2. In the model, executives face a trade-oﬀ every
7The use of the H-P ﬁlter in the variables aﬀected by the business cycle creates autocorrelation in the
regression results presented below. I present robust standard errors as one possible correction. Use of
bootstrapped standard errors gives very similar results.
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period in where to focus their eﬀort, which is, in turn, inﬂuenced by their marginal tax rate.
This implies that a higher marginal tax rate will be associated with higher growth in income
for the bottom 90% whereas the level will mainly depend on the previous period's level. The
use of the H-P ﬁlter is meant to identify the contemporaneous eﬀects in the long-run trend
of the variables. How well it does this depends on how well it ﬁlters out the business cycle
eﬀects within the variables8.
In addition to the total time period (1930-2008), I also provide a breakdown for what
is considered the high growth period (1948-1973) and the more recent period of low growth
(1974-2008) (see, for example, Cowen [2011]). What is perhaps striking is that while real
average income growth of the bottom 90% did fall precipitously from 2.43% per year to
0.07% per year, average annual growth in real GDP per capita fell by only 12 basis points
(from 2.06% to 1.94%). The biggest changes from these two time periods are private-sector
unionization (32% vs 13%), imports (4.6% vs. 11.7%) and especially the MTR for the top
0.01% (76.75% vs. 45.67%).
[Table 1 about here.]
I focus on the top 1% and the top 0.01% because of the likelihood that these groups
include the greatest number of executives with inﬂuence over the greatest number of em-
ployees. For example, Piketty and Saez [2003] note that in 2006 the average pay of the
top 100 CEOs (including salary, bonus, and exercised stock options) was over $55 million,
putting them comfortably in the top 0.01%. In addition, the tax data shows that there is a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the threshold income level of the top 1% and the top 0.01%.
8Jones [1995] ﬁnds that real GDP per capita growth is stationary. That is, using the Dickey-Fuller test,
we can reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in the data. He uses this fact to show that there
are signiﬁcant problems with much of the endogenous growth theory literature in which the (increasing,
non-stationary) explanatory variables, such as capital investment, levels of human capital, etc., are used to
explain a stationary variable which appears to simply ﬂuctuate around a trend line. The analysis here could
suﬀer from the same problems and I address this issue in Appendix A. The takeaway from that analysis
is that while the full data for growth (real GDP, bottom 90%, top 1%) does appear to be stationary, the
Dickey-Fuller test on the H-P trend of these variables fails to reject non-stationarity. Furthermore, there is
evidence of cointegration between the endogenous variables in the model and fully-modiﬁed OLS regressions
of the structural equations ﬁnds coeﬃcients of similar magnitude and signiﬁcance to those presented below
in Table 2.
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In nominal dollars, and not including capital gains, the 1973 thresholds respectively were
$45,500 and $242,900 (or a ratio of 5.34). By 2007 these thresholds had increased to $347,600
and $6,886,000 (or a ratio of 19.8). There has also been much less variation in the MTR for
those just in the top 1% in the post-WWII period (a range of 28-54% with a standard devi-
ation of 7.2) as opposed to the top 0.01% (ranging from 28-89% with a standard deviation
of 20.1).
The small size of the top 0.01%, about 15,000 households, also implies that this group is
more likely to be able to overcome the collective action problem ﬁrst noted by Olson [1965].
Indeed, given that this group has control over the most ﬁnancial resources, it would require
only a small minority involved in lobbying the political system to have a potentially large
eﬀect. The bottom 90%, on the other hand, has a much harder row to hoe to overcome the
collective action problem. In the earlier decades of this sample, unions were able to help
solve this collective action problem and exert signiﬁcant political pressure. Union decline in
recent decades, however, has left labor with very little voice in the political process. It is
not surprising that the elite tend to have their interests better represented than the median
voter (Bartels [2009]).
One area which the model is not able to control for is the treatment of corporate vs.
personal income. There have been a number of changes to the tax code in how business
income is treated and taxed. However, as Piketty and Saez [2003] have shown, the main
increase in income for the top 0.01% has been from wage and salary income and from
business income, which has increasingly come from S-corporations after the 1981 and 1986
tax reform (Saez et al. [2012]) and which is taxed at personal income rates. This likely makes
the personal marginal tax rate faced by those at the top of the income distribution the most
relevant one for executives, and I use it to test this model.
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3.2 Structural Equation Model Estimation
While the model oﬀers a straightforward explanation of how the MTRs faced by executives
inﬂuence wage and productivity growth, in reality the picture must be much more muddied.
While the top MTRs may aﬀect growth in per capita real GDP, real GDP growth will
certainly inﬂuence the growth rate in the average income of the bottom 90%. Similarly, if
executives work to reduce the inﬂuence of unions, unions will certainly work to reduce the
inﬂuence of executives, perhaps by lobbying for higher top MTRs. In addition, increased
purchasing power by the bottom 90% could lead ﬁrms to produce more, increasing growth in
per capita real GDP and corporate proﬁts. On the other hand, a larger presence of private
unions in the economy may reduce economic growth by making ﬁrms less ﬂexible. This
implies that there is a positive feedback mechanism in the model in which executives are
able to increase their bargaining power which then leads to lower labor power, lower marginal
tax rates, and more executive bargaining power. Of course, the feedback loop appeared to
be working in the opposite direction earlier in the sample period.
In order to control for this endogeneity, I use a full-information maximum likelihood
structural equation model. This allows a measure of direct eﬀects, such as the eﬀect of top
MTRs on unionization and imports, but also allows for indirect eﬀects. For example, while
I do not include the top MTRs in the structural equation for the growth rate of the average
income for the bottom 90% (eqn (i) below) they are included as structural variables in the
equations determining unionization rates and imports. Because these variables enter into
the growth of average income for the bottom 90%, we can see the indirect eﬀect the top tax
rates have on worker income. The direct and indirect eﬀects add up to the total eﬀect and
all three are reported below.
The eight structural equations in the model are:
gωt = αk + Fk (gyt, uniont, impt, ωtLt/Yt, Πt/Yt) +Gk (y¯t, GDt,WW2t) (i)
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gyt = αk + Fk
(
τ 1t , τ
0.01
t , uniont
)
+Gk (τ¯t, m¯trt, y¯t, GDt,WW2t) (ii)
uniont = αk + Fk
(
τ 1t , τ
0.01
t , impt
)
+Gk (GDt,WW2t) (iii)
impt = αk + Fk
(
τ 1t , τ
0.01
t , uniont
)
+Gk (expt, GDt,WW2t) (iv)
Πt/Yt = αk + Fk
(
gyt, τ
1
t , τ
0.01
t , impt, uniont
)
+Gk (expt, GDt,WW2t) (v)
ωtLt/Yt = αk + Fk
(
gyt, τ
1
t , τ
0.01
t , impt, uniont
)
+Gk (expt, GDt,WW2t) (vi)
τ 1t = αk + Fk
(
τ 0.01t , uniont
)
+Gk (τ¯t, m¯trt, GDt,WW2t, HRt, Sent, P rest) (vii)
τ 0.01t = αk + Fk
(
τ 1t , uniont
)
+Gk (τ¯t, m¯trt, GDt,WW2t, HRt, Sent, P rest) (viii)
The constant, αk, is allowed to vary by equation k, and the endogenous variables in the
model are (i) the average income growth of the bottom 90%, gωt , (ii) real GDP growth per
capita, gyt, (iii) private union membership as a percentage of private employees, uniont, (iv)
imports as a percentage of GDP, impt, (v) corporate proﬁts as a percentage of GDP, Πt/Yt,
(vi) the wage and salary share of GDP, ωtLt/Yt, (vii) the MTR for those just in the top 1%,
τ 1t and (viii) the MTR for those just in the top 0.01%, τ
0.01
t . The exogenous variables in
the model include dummy variables for the Great Depression (1930-1940), GDt, and World
War II (1941-1945), WW2t, the overall average MTR, ¯mtrt from Barro and Redlick [2011],
total federal taxes as a percent of GDP, τ¯t, exports as a percentage of GDP, expt, and three
political variables: the percent of House, HRt, and Senate, Sent, seats held by Democrats
and a dummy variable if the president is a Democrat, Prest. The eight k equations are
broken up into the eﬀect of endogenous variables, Fk(·), and the eﬀect of variables assumed
to be exogenous, Gk(·)9. The relationship between the endogenous variables is summarized
in the stylized path diagram in Figure 2.
9While the dummy time period variables might not be controversial choices for exogeneity, the others
may require more explanation. I assume that average federal taxes and average income are not aﬀected
by the relative bargaining power between labor and executives, but only the relative weight faced by each
group. That is, given an exogenous total tax revenue requirement, G¯ in the model, how the various groups
pay is what is endogenous to the model. Exports are assumed to vary due to international macroeconomic
and political causes outside the model, and the determination of the political variables is outside the scope
of this model and are also assumed to be exogenous.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
Table 2 provides regression results for the SEM model above. Each of the eight columns
represents one of the structural equations and provides coeﬃcient estimates for the direct,
indirect, and total eﬀects of each variable. A value of No path states that there is no
path in the model for that variable to aﬀect that dependent variable10. Robust standard
errors are provided in parentheses with one, two, and three asterisks representing statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
[Table 2 about here.]
The ﬁrst hypothesis, H1, in section 2 is that higher marginal top tax rates will reduce
economic growth as those at the top reduce their eﬀort. Column (ii) provides mixed support
for this hypothesis. There does seem to be strong evidence that higher MTRs for the top 1%
do have negative eﬀects on growth both directly and indirectly. The total eﬀect implies that
a 1 percentage point increase in the top MTR reduces growth in real GDP per capita by
0.163 percentage points. On the other hand, the direct eﬀect of the MTR on the top 0.01%
is positive, as is the total eﬀect, although only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Recall that the
percent of executives in the top percentiles increases as we move up the income ladder. It
could be that there is a more traditional labor supply responses to MTRs among the top 1%
than there is among the top 0.01%. The diﬀerence between the eﬀects of the two tax rates
will be a recurring theme in these results.
The second hypothesis, H2, is that higher top MTRs should lead to lower corporate
proﬁts as executives expend less eﬀort in bargaining and labor costs increase. From column
(v), higher MTRs for the top 1% do have a negative eﬀect on corporate proﬁts, but once
again, the eﬀect is the opposite for the top MTRs of the top 0.01%. One possibility is that
these corporate proﬁts are, by necessity, measured post executive pay. If top MTRs reduce
executive pay, as was found by Piketty et al. [2014], then it would make sense for higher
103SLS results are similar in sign to the direct eﬀects reported here although coeﬃcients tend to be larger
in absolute value and more likely to be signiﬁcant.
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MTRs for the top 0.01% (those best paid executives) to increase total corporate proﬁts by
reducing executive pay.
The relative bargaining power of the ﬁrm is captured by the next two hypotheses, H3a
and H3b, which state that higher top MTRs should increase (private sector) unionization
and decrease the use of oﬀshore production (and, therefore, imports). Column (iii) shows
that the direct eﬀect on unionization of the top 0.01% MTR supports this hypothesis, but
the coeﬃcient on the MTR for the top 1% has a negative sign. A one percentage point
increase in the MTR for the top 0.01% has a direct increase of 0.216 percentage points on
private sector unionization. And while the direct eﬀect of private sector unionization on
income growth for the bottom 90% is not statistically signiﬁcant, the indirect eﬀect is quite
signiﬁcant, mainly working through the increase in imports. So while column (iv) shows that
the eﬀects of the top MTRs on imports is fairly ambiguous and, in general, not statistically
signiﬁcant, there is a signiﬁcantly negative direct eﬀect of imports on the income growth for
workers, and an increase in imports leads to a large and signiﬁcant decrease in unionization
(and an increase in proﬁts). This leads to a signiﬁcantly positive indirect (and total) eﬀect
of unionization levels on worker income growth.
There is no direct path for the top MTRs to aﬀect the growth in average income of the
bottom 90%, but we see that the indirect eﬀects are both signiﬁcant, although of opposite
sign. Given the eﬀects of the top MTRs on growth, this is what was expected from our
fourth hypothesis, which stated that if higher top MTRs decreased real GDP growth, then
it was possible they would decrease growth of average incomes for the bottom 90% (as is
the case for the MTR for the top 1%). On the other hand, if increases in the top MTR did
not decrease economic growth, as is the case for the top 0.01%, then higher top MTRs were
likely to increase growth for the bottom 90%. Column (i) shows that a one percentage point
increase in the MTR of the top 0.01% leads to an increase in growth for the bottom 90% of
0.084 percentage points while a one percentage point increase in the MTR for the top 1%
decreases the growth rate for the bottom 90% by 0.301 percentage points.
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While these results do not show causality, the correlations are in line with the theory
presented in section 2. The size of the estimated coeﬃcients implies that the change in the
relative bargaining power between labor and ﬁrms as shown by the drop in the average MTR
of the top 0.01% from the 1948-1973 period to the 1974-2008 period has the potential to
explain most of the shrinkage in income growth for the bottom 90%. These eﬀects seem to
be mainly coming from the eﬀect of the top MTRs on union membership (iii), real GDP
growth (ii), and imports (iv). Higher MTRs for the top 0.01% increase private unionization,
which in turn increases growth for the bottom 90% (mainly through lower import levels).
The MTR for the top 1% has the opposite eﬀect on unionization. The eﬀects on imports is a
little less clear, but higher top MTRs seem to decrease imports (although not signiﬁcantly),
while imports in turn reduce average income growth for the bottom 90%. Again, the eﬀect
for the MTR of the top 1% is the opposite.
Finally, columns (vii) and (viii) show that higher private sector unionization does lead to
higher top MTRs, providing some evidence for the struggle over bargaining power and the
potential positive feedback loop over which income group will end up paying the country's tax
bill. The model also provides some reason to be wary of increasingly freer trade. In support
of the model, imports do increase corporate proﬁts by reducing labor costs. However, in
the model, and in the econometric results, increases in trade reduce the bargaining power
of workers and reduce the growth rate in their average incomes, in the share of wages and
salaries, and, at least in these results, in total growth in real GDP per capita. This is
consistent with ﬁndings from Autor et al. [2013] and Ebenstein et al. [2013], but it would be
interesting to divide up trade between countries of similar labor costs, in which traditional
comparative advantage arguments may hold, and trade between countries with disparate
levels of development in which the eﬀects of this type of model may be dominant.
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4 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to show how top MTRs may aﬀect the pre-tax
distribution of income, not only by reducing the income of those at the very top (as would
be suggested by standard economic theory) but also by increasing the growth of income for
the bottom 90%. The model presented here suggests that executives will work more (or
more intensively) to increase bargaining power of the ﬁrm and decrease their labor costs
when they face lower MTRs, increasing their income and decreasing that of their workers.
At the same time, they may work harder to increase ﬁrm-level productivity so that lower
top MTRs will yield to faster growth. Overall, the model suggests that higher top MTRs on
the top 1% can hurt economic growth (which can then hurt workers), while increasing the
top MTR on the top 0.01%, a group which includes the highest paid CEOs in the largest
companies, has only positive eﬀects for economic growth in total and for the bottom 90%.
The model implies that there can be a positive feedback loop in which one group ﬁnds it
easier to increase its bargaining power at the expense of the other group as it increases its
share of the economic pie.
Taken all together, the results in section 3 imply that while there is support for the
assumption that top 0.01% executives have an eﬀect on the ﬁrm's wage bill and will work
harder to reduce it when they face a lower MTR, especially by reducing private sector
unionization, they have little eﬀect on technological growth (although there is a negative
eﬀect on growth from the top tax rate for the top 1%). On a macroeconomic level, therefore,
while the pre-tax distribution of income seems to have changed signiﬁcantly over time due
to changing top MTRs, there is no negative eﬀect on growth from (much) higher tax rates
for the very richest. In fact, the data show a positive relationship between the top MTR and
overall GDP growth. This implies that there may be an aggregate demand eﬀect of changing
the top MTR in which higher wages for the bottom 90% boost overall demand leading to an
increase in supply, higher growth rates, and higher corporate proﬁts.
The full-information maximum likelihood structural equation model results presented
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above suggest that higher MTRs on the top 0.01% work indirectly on the average income
growth of the bottom 90%. First, lower top MTRs are associated with lower levels of private-
sector unionization. This, in turn, reduces the income growth of the bottom 90%. The eﬀect
of lower top MTRs on import levels is somewhat ambiguous, but higher import levels do
lead to lower levels of unionization and higher corporate proﬁts, which in turn leads to lower
income growth for the bottom 90%.
The eﬀects of the MTRs for the top 1% are almost completely opposite than those of
the top 0.01%. This implies that contrary to recent practice (at least since the 1980s) of
ﬂattening the federal income tax by reducing the number of brackets, it is possible that we
would want more tax brackets at the very top, keeping the rate relatively low for those just
in the top 1% and then increasing it sharply for those in the top 0.1% and 0.01%. This was
the case for most of the years in the time series used here. The diﬀerence between the top
0.01% MTR and the top 1% MTR averaged 33.2 percentage points between 1930 until 1981,
but only 2.4 percentage points from 1982 to 2008.
This is only one time series in one country. It's certainly possible that the driving force
was increased global competition from higher exogenous trade levels, which decreased the
power of more expensive union labor and decreased income growth except for those at the
top. This would require either a coincidental decrease in top MTRs during the same period or
perhaps a misguided policy of reducing tax rates in order to provide incentives for executives
to spur economic growth. The historical evidence, however, does provide some support for the
positive feedback loop in the model in that executives at the top of the income distribution
pushed to decrease union power after WWII with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and
then the Kennedy-era tax cuts. Union power was further reduced throughout the 1970s and
1980s (e.g. Reagan and the PATCO strike) as executives increased their bargaining power
further. An interesting next step would be a cross-country analysis over as long a period
as possible looking at the eﬀects of top MTRs on private sector unionization, trade (with
developed and developing countries), and the overall eﬀect on economic growth and growth
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of the bottom 90%.
We should bear in mind that a number of developed countries, also competing in the
same globalized market, have not seen such large increases in the pre-tax income share of
those at the top. As Piketty et al. [2014] show, countries such as Germany, France, Sweden,
Spain, and Denmark have not seen the same increase in inequality over the last 45-50 years as
the United States (and United Kingdom). In addition, a number of countries have changed
their top MTRs signiﬁcantly over this period while a number of others have kept top rates
relatively high. They show that there is a strong correlation between changes in the top MTR
and the top 1% income share (and CEO compensation). Expanding their results to focus
on the average real income growth of the bottom 90%, and its relationship to unionization
and trade, would provide more evidence for or against the hypothesis that executives work
harder to reduce labor costs when top MTRs are lower.
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A Stationarity and Non-Stationarity in Long-Term Trend
Data
As noted in the text, Jones [1995] argues against using non-stationary explanatory variables
to explain a stationary dependent variable such as growth in real GDP per capita11. Jones's
argument is that if a variable is stationary it will return to its long-run trend. If the ex-
planatory variables in the model are all trending up or downfor example, physical capital
investment, human capital levels, or resources devoted to R&Dthen the theory fails the
empirical test. And there is little question that, using annual data, non-stationarity in real
GDP per capita growth can be ﬁrmly rejected using the Dickey-Fuller or Phillips-Perron
test. In fact, these tests reject non-stationarity in all of the growth variables in the model as
11My thanks to an anonymous reviewer who raised these objections and suggested this line of reasoning.
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well as annual growth in average income for the top 1% and top 0.01%. But in the pre-1974
range, the average annual income growth for these top two groups averaged 0.78% and 0.06%
respectively. In the 1974-2008 time period, average annual growth increased to 3.14% for
the top 1% and 6.34% for the top 0.01%. Yet the MacKinnon approximate p-value on the
Dickey-Fuller tests for these two variables is less than 0.00001, allowing us to conﬁdently
reject non-stationarity.
Table 3 presents the p-value of two unit root tests for the endogenous variables in the
SEM regressions presented above, as well as for annual growth in average incomes for those
at the top. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the annual data and the H-P trend.
The tests are unable to reject non-stationarity for any of the H-P trend variables.
[Table 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows observed annual data and the calculated H-P trend for these growth
variables. While the eye test says that the trend in real GDP per capita growth is perhaps
the most likely to be stationary (at least after WWII), the others appear clearly not to be.
Average income growth for the bottom 90% is clearly positive until the mid-1970s and then
basically zero after that. Average income growth for both the top 1% and the top 0.01% has
the opposite pattern in which it was close to zero or even negative until the mid-1970s and
has been quite positive since then.
[Figure 3 about here.]
This suggests that the business cycle may be interfering in tests for stationarity. Because
recessions are followed by expansions, and vice versa, the standard tests for stationarity
may be setting themselves up for failure when looking for long-run changes in the trend.
As we have seen, using the trend data calculated by applying the H-P ﬁlter, unit-root tests
fail to reject the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity (Table 3). If this is the case, tests for
cointegration should be used to check for a long-run relationship between the variables.
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Table 4 estimates the cointegrating rank of the structural equations in the model. There
is signiﬁcant evidence of cointegration between the variables in almost all of the structural
equations.
[Table 4 about here]
This evidence of cointegration implies that a method such as fully-modiﬁed OLS (FMOLS)
may be appropriate in identifying these long-run relationships. Table 5 presents FMOLS re-
sults for each of the structural equations (i)-(viii) while using the H-P trend data in the same
way as Table 2. In addition, I present Dynamic OLS (DOLS) results using the (non-H-P
trend) annual data. DOLS allows for a lead and lag of the explanatory variables. This is not
dissimilar to taking the H-P trend which uses lags and leads to separate the cyclical eﬀect
from the long-run trend. Of course, the non-trend data, according to the unit-root tests in
Table 3, are stationary, so this may not be an appropriate method. I also provide the direct
eﬀects from the SEM maximum-likelihood regressions in Table 2 for comparison.
[Table 5 about here]
The Fully Modiﬁed OLS regressions show very similar results to the Full Information
Maximum Likelihood Structural Equation Model from section 3. The only signiﬁcant excep-
tion is equation (iv) for imports as a percentage of GDP. Here, the signs switch for the top
0.01% and top 1% marginal tax rates (although none are very signiﬁcant) and private union
membership is strongly correlated with lower imports as would be expected from the model.
The general story of how top marginal tax rates aﬀects the bottom 90% average income
growth is basically the same. Higher marginal tax rates on the top 0.01% are correlated
with higher private union membership and faster GDP growth. Higher union membership,
in this case, is associated with lower imports. And both higher growth and lower imports
are associated with faster growth in average income for the bottom 90%.
The Dynamic OLS regressions, which do not use the H-P trend data and include only
one lag and one lead for the explanatory variables, show somewhat diﬀerent results. This
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is especially true for the dependent variables which are now not H-P ﬁltered, the bottom
90% average income growth (i) and real GDP per capita growth (ii). Looking at column (ii),
this appears to be capturing business cycle eﬀects which have been removed from the SEM
FIML and FMOLS regressions with the H-P trend variables. The DOLS results are, not
surprisingly, much more similar in the columns that do not include business cycle variables
such as union membership (iii) and imports (iv).
These results still do not identify causation between the variables, but as they are gener-
ally consistent with the Full Information Maximum Likelihood Structural Equation Model
from section 3, we can be more conﬁdent that issues of stationarity are not obscuring the
true correlations between the variables of interest.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1930-2008
1930-2008 1948-1973 1974-2008
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Endogenous Variables
Bottom 90% Average Income Growth* 1.75 2.35 -2.00 8.13 2.43 0.71 0.07 0.48
Real GDP Growth per capita* 2.47 1.49 0.35 7.15 2.06 0.69 1.94 0.25
Top 0.01% Average Income Growth* 2.25 4.22 -3.99 11.24 0.06 1.07 6.34 2.60
Top 1% Average Income Growth* 1.79 1.86 -2.54 5.86 0.93 0.82 3.14 1.66
Private Union Membership 21.64 9.78 7.40 35.70 32.05 2.95 13.25 5.06
Imports/GDP 7.49 4.22 2.84 17.89 4.55 0.70 11.72 2.63
Corporate Proﬁts/GDP* 9.01 1.72 4.62 11.00 10.46 0.61 8.65 0.90
Wages & Salaries/GDP* 49.50 2.08 45.19 51.66 51.45 0.18 47.43 1.34
Top 0.01% Marginal Fed Tax Rate 59.49 20.31 24.0 92.0 76.75 7.76 45.67 14.68
Top 1% Marginal Fed Tax Rate 35.98 13.33 3.0 54.0 42.29 4.72 39.83 8.71
Exogenous Variables***
Overall Average MTR** 27.64 11.43 1.8 41.8 25.87 2.84 37.41 2.14
Total Federal Taxes/GDP 15.47 4.67 3.28 20.35 16.85 1.28 17.88 1.01
Log Average Income 10.37 0.43 9.47 10.87 10.37 0.19 10.72 0.09
Exports/GDP 6.83 2.73 2.01 12.92 5.08 0.62 9.55 1.39
Percent Democrat House 57.42 8.13 37.70 76.78 57.26 5.75 56.14 7.11
Percent Democrat Senate 55.91 8.87 40.63 79.17 57.44 6.97 51.26 5.83
Democratic President 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.51 0.34 0.48
*: Business-cycle component removed with H-P ﬁlter
**: Includes state taxes
***: Exogenous variables also include dummy variables for the Great Depression (1930-40) and WWII (1941-45)
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Table 3: Tests for stationarity in endogenous variables (business cycle vs. trend data)
Variable Dickey-Fuller (p-value) Phillips-Perron** (p-value)
Annual Data H-P Trend Annual Data H-P Trend
Bottom 90% Avg. Inc. Gr. 0.0001 0.6014 0.0000 0.3237
Real GDP per Capita Gr. 0.0000 0.5395 0.0000 0.1663
Private Union Memb 0.9674 N/A 0.9102 N/A
Imports/GDP 0.9989 N/A 0.9991 N/A
Corp Proﬁt/GDP 0.1038 0.2939 0.0293 0.3587
Wages & Salaries/GDP 0.7368 1.0000 0.6449 0.9974
Top 0.01% Marg. Tax Rate 0.5547 N/A 0.4986 N/A
Top 1% Marg. Tax Rate 0.1751 N/A 0.1732 N/A
Top 0.01% Avg. Inc. Gr.* 0.0000 0.8307 0.0000 0.7062
Top 1% Avg. Inc. Gr.* 0.0000 0.3822 0.0000 0.2768
Table shows MacKinnon p-value for the Dickey-Fuller or Phillips-Perron test for unit root. All variables
from 1930-2008.
* Variables not included in SEM in main results. Presented here for illustrative purposes.
** Includes 3 Newey-West lags
39
Table 4: Cointegration rank of structural equations
Equation
Dependent Number of Cointegration Rank
Variable Independent Variables* (Johansen Test)**
(i) Bottom 90% Real Average Income Growth 6 5
(ii) Real GDP per capita Growth 6 4
(iii) Private Union Membership (%) 3 0
(iv) Imports/GDP 4 1
(v) Corporate Proﬁt/GDP 6 3
(vi) Wages & Salaries/GDP 6 3
(vii) Top 0.01% Marginal Fed Tax Rate 6 3
(viii) Top 1% Marginal Fed Tax Rate 6 3
* Excludes dummy variables for Great Depression, WWII, and Democratic President due to collinearity.
** Largest rank for which trace statistic is larger than the 5% critical value. Includes two lags.
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Figure 1: Marginal Tax Rates and Unionization
44
Figure 2: Path Analysis Diagram of Endogenous Variables
45
Figure 3: Annual data vs. H-P trend data, various growth rates
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